In 2004, India and the EU officially elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership. However, the relationship remained the same for most of the next ten years. In 2013, talks on a comprehensive trade and investment agreement (BTIA) collapsed due to disagreements over market access, data protection, labor standards and regulatory independence. What happened next was a long period of diplomatic drift.
After 2020, this inertia began to fade. New Delhi and Brussels have had to rethink their economic ties due to the pandemic, supply chain issues and growing competition between the United States and China. The EU, worried about being too close to China, began looking for other options. India, despite its own strategic problems, sought deeper economic and technological partnerships that went beyond traditional alliances.
The clearest sign of this change was the resumption of trade negotiations in 2022. But recent events show that the relationship now goes well beyond just trade.
Resumption of free trade negotiations is difficult and time-consuming, and neither side believes they will end quickly or completely. But their importance comes more from their seriousness than from what is happening immediately.
India’s negotiations with the EU are a test of its ability to protect its own industries while meeting high-level market membership needs. India is not only a large market for the EU, but also a long-term means of protecting itself from the concentration of economic power in East Asia.
This time, the modular approach is not the same. The two sides divided the negotiations into three groups: trade, investment protection and geographical indications, instead of trying to reach a major agreement. This allows things to move slowly while reducing the risk of political problems. This shows that you know that complete settlement can only occur if it occurs naturally. Technology has become a more promising field. Working together on digital public infrastructure, semiconductors, artificial intelligence and green technologies shows how they can work together. India has a lot of people, data ecosystems and industrial goals, while the EU has a lot of regulatory know-how, money and advanced research skills. The problem is not the objective, but how to achieve it: transforming grades into results.
Values will always be discussed in negotiations between India and the EU. The EU is concerned about India’s civil liberties, minority rights and democratic backsliding. India, on the other hand, views some of these efforts as selective and politically motivated.
The tone has changed, but not the content. Modern exchanges have placed communication before denunciation rather than public conflict. Not because disagreements have disappeared, but because both parties know that consistent moral posturing makes collaboration more difficult.
The EU has also faced problems within its own ranks. When its own strategic interests were at stake, it was far less important for it to work with other countries on democratic issues. New Delhi did not miss this. The end result is a calmer, more professional relationship, focused on manageability rather than alignment.
The main reason for renewed cooperation between India and the EU is geopolitical uncertainty. The war in Ukraine, problems in the Middle East and instability in global trade have all shown the weakness of old alliances. India is an unusual mix for Europe. It is a large democracy with a growing economy and a strategic player that is not officially part of any major power bloc. The EU gives India access to markets, technology and diplomatic support without the harsh demands of the United States or the imbalance of China.
This does not mean that the partnership is free from tensions. Disagreements persist over Russia, energy supplies and global governance. However, both sides appear keen to compartmentalize issues rather than let them undermine collaboration.
Despite recent progress, relations between India and the EU remain hampered by institutional and political limits. Decision-making in the EU is slow and fragmented. India’s regulatory instability continues to worry European investors. Public opinion on both sides remains largely indifferent to this relationship, depriving it of significant political force.
Most importantly, neither side sees the other as indispensable – yet. This keeps expectations reasonable while limiting ambition. Recent developments indicate that India and the EU are not establishing revolutionary relations. They are approaching a more mature phase, based on shared interests, tempered by differences and characterized by prudence.
If the previous phase was defined by untapped potential, the current phase is defined by managed expectations. It may seem less exciting, but it’s definitely more sustainable. In a world where alliances frequently swing between hype and animosity, the delay in institutionalizing relations between India and the EU could prove to be its greatest strength.
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