Barely a few years ago, Donald Trump was considered a reliable partner in New Delhi. With its high-level appearances in Houston in 2019, under the slogan “Howdy, Modi!”, And to Ahmedabad in 2020, this time, it was “Namaste, Trump”, the Indo-American partnership reached a symbolic level which suggested equality and mutual respect. Common interests in the transfer of Indo-Pacific and Croissant technology and mutual investments seemed to pave the way for deeper strategic cooperation.
But even during Trump’s first term, trade problems remained a painful point in bilateral relations. Many publicly announced agreements have met expectations. However, this phase has made progress in defense cooperation. Trump’s second term, on the other hand, means less continuity for India and much more a break, for which New Delhi does not seem prepared. The prices announced will harm India in the short term, but in the long term, Washington could lose more than New Delhi.
Grace
The break took place in several stages. First, in the spring of 2025, Trump presented himself as a mediator in the brief but intense conflict between India and Pakistan – a role that New Delhi has decisively rejected. A few weeks later, there was a massive trade policy of Tour de Fire: In response to continuous oil imports from India from Russia, Washington has doubled import rights over Indian products from 25 to 50%.
President Donald Trump recently described the Indian economy as a “dead economy” and criticized New Delhi’s business practices in his usual live rhetoric. In several public statements, he questioned India’s economic performance and accused the government of a lack of cooperation in bilateral trade. The latter is understandable because India can indeed be a difficult trading partner – mainly because of its protectionist approach. Trump also cooperated with Pakistan in a way that drew public attention.
This meant that India went from a privileged partner to the target of commercial policy, while other countries like China and Turkey have known practically no consequences of similar behavior in the purchase of Russian energy sources. At least it is the Indian perspective. The message was clear: in the second term of Trump, the previous values and partnerships do not count, only the utility – definable by Donald Trump.
It becomes clear that with the exception of China, no other power center could respond to the change of the old hegemon and take effective countermeasures, for example in the customs dispute.
India, which has benefited from special arrangements and symbolic gestures during the first mandate, is now experiencing a foreign policy which is transactional to the extreme. It remains to be seen if Trump wants to increase the pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine and risk relations with India. One thing is certain, however: the role of America has radically changed.
For decades, the United States has been the backbone of liberal world order – militarily, economically and institutionally. The transatlantic alliance has formed the normative nucleus. Washington guaranteed security structures, defended multilateral institutions and shaped globalization rules. All this is now over. The international order based on rules which was created after 1945 under American leaders thus loses its central guarantor, and the world is at a point of historical tilting. In the journey of multipolarity multilateralism, we are currently in limbo – in an interrelage. New alliances, uncertainties and rivalries emerge between emerging power centers. At the same time, it becomes clear that with the exception of China, there is no other power center which could respond to the change of course of the old Hegemon and take effective countermeasures, for example in the customs dispute.
Trump’s protectionist renewal with punitive prices highlights the disappearance of the existing order. India is not spared it, but it does not currently have the ability to respond appropriately. The latest American measures specifically target strategic relevance products for India. This even points out that supposed geopolitical partners no longer benefit from preferential economic treatment under American doctrine.
India is under structural pressure in this emerging order. On the one hand, the country acts more and more as a geopolitical actor sure of itself: with a growing economy, a young and dynamic population and a government which is positioned as the voice of the world South. New Delhi claims an active role in the reshaping of international control structures, but has also greatly benefited from an order based on rules.
Unlike China, which has constituted a solid export architecture over the decades, India does not yet have comparable levers to respond flexibly to external pressure or reinforces compensatory power.
On the other hand, this ambition remains limited in important sectors due to real vulnerabilities and a lack of electrical resources. India continues to be highly dependent on world supply chains in technologically critical fields such as semiconductors’ production, civil and military aviation, pharmaceutical products and the energy sector. Its own industrial policy, for example as part of the production incentive program, is ambitious but not yet capable of ensuring short -term strategic self -sufficiency. Structural weaknesses are added: a fragmented industrial base, an informal oversized sector with low productivity and a relatively close export diversity according to international standards.
Only a few industries – mainly IT services, pharmaceutical products and jewelry – contribute significantly to the export volume. At the same time, many of these sectors do not reside in protectionist measures. This economic asymmetry makes New Delhi particularly vulnerable to external shocks such as the sudden increase in American prices. Unlike China, which has constituted a solid export architecture over the decades, India does not yet have comparable levers to respond flexibly to external pressure or reinforces compensatory power.
Invent in the plate
And yet, it is precisely this moment of geopolitical shock that also presents a strategic opportunity for New Delhi. Current upheavals could encourage the country, while it continues its increase, to continue existing initiatives to diversify its commercial partnerships with even greater vigor. The intensification of relations with the European Union, for example by the desired conclusion of negotiations on a free trade agreement, is an expression of this reorientation. The opening of India to economic and strategic partners such as Indonesia, Vietnam and the Gulf States also demonstrates its strategy of enlargement of its base.
At the same time, there is an increasing desire to engage in a tactical rapprochement with geopolitical competitors such as China. Although there are deep structural differences, border conflicts with divergent interests in Indo-Pacific, selective cooperation also becomes an option in a world of relative instability. The extent to which this is true could already become apparent at the next summit of the Shanghai cooperation organization, which Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi should also attend in person. India does not seek to belong to a block, but wants to preserve its strategic autonomy by widening its options.
What we consider in Washington as a strong sign of leadership is actually a foreign policy error. India is about to become one of the decisive powers of the 21st century – militarily, economically and geopolitically. The weakening of this country through prices undermines its own global relevance and will damage bilateral relations in the medium and long term. Trump reduces the last 25 years of strengthening confidence in absurdity with a hand. The Americans could also unconsciously change the strategic perspective of the BRICS and contribute to a rapprochement of the positions within this alliance.
Anyone considered unreliable in New Delhi will lose the influence in a key state of the World Development Order.
The status of the United States as a favorite partner of India has not been given since August 2025 at the latest. He will have to be renegotiated in the future, because pressure and threats do not reach anything in India. This could cost Washington dearly in its systemic competition with China. Anyone considered to be unreliable in New Delhi will lose an influence in a key state of the World Development Order – an actor who is becoming more and more important as an economic and security counterweight in Beijing and as a bridges in the world South, even if he is likely to lose in the short -term tariff dispute.
India will continue to diversify its foreign, economic and commercial policies towards the EU, the Anase, the Middle East and the South world. And also towards China, if it serves its own interests. In an increasingly volatile world, trust and reliability have become strategic resources – and the United States is currently slipping them into New Delhi.
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