European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (right) and European Council President Antonio Luis Santos da Costa (left) pose for photos with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (center) before a meeting at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, January 27. Photo by Rajat Gupta/EPA
If there was any doubt that Brussels and New Delhi are entering a new era, the 16th EU-India summit on January 27 erased it. European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spoke with Prime Minister Narendra Modi to unveil an agenda as broad as it is strategic: a long-awaited free trade agreement, a new security and defense partnership, and a comprehensive five-year strategic roadmap covering everything from maritime security to high-tech innovation.
For Europe, this goes beyond simple market access. It is a pivot born out of economic security concerns and the recognition that India is a central pillar of the future global economy. The European Commission considers the FTA the most important that the two sides have ever concluded. The numbers support the ambition: EU-India trade already exceeds €180 billion ($211.8 billion) per year, supporting almost 800,000 European jobs. Under the new deal, EU goods exports to India could double by 2032, saving exporters around 4 billion euros ($4.7 billion) in annual customs duties.
This is not a cosmetic opening. India has pledged to reduce or eliminate tariffs covering 96.6% of the value of EU goods exports – the most ambitious liberalization New Delhi has ever granted to a partner. This provides privileged access to European companies in the chemicals, machinery and medical devices sectors, while India gains in labor-intensive sectors and professional mobility. This is an economic rebalancing that serves the interests of both parties.
The security dimension
Security deliverables are equally important. After years of progressive maritime dialogues, the new SDP provides a formal framework to deepen cooperation on cybersecurity, counter-terrorism and defense industry ties. Importantly, the two sides also launched negotiations on an information security agreement – the “critical plumbing” needed for true interoperability beyond simple exercises and photo ops.
This partnership is not a withdrawal into oneself. While the joint statement reiterates its commitment to a rules-based international order, it grapples with the world as it is: Russia’s war in Ukraine, unrest in Gaza and a more contested Indo-Pacific. Both sides committed to supporting a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine, based on sovereignty and territorial integrity, while recognizing areas in which their assessments diverge. This realism reflects a relationship that has evolved beyond rhetoric and into uncompromising statecraft.
It was impossible not to notice the political aspect of this breakthrough. EU leaders were guests of honor at India’s 77th Republic Day celebrations. This symbolism highlights how India now looms large in European foreign policy priorities as the transatlantic center of gravity shifts.
The Washington contrast
All this is happening as the EU hedges against US political uncertainty. By “de-risking” China and anchoring its ties with India, Brussels is building an economic security strategy less exposed to unilateral tariff shocks or extraterritorial demands.
This summit imposes an uncomfortable comparison: while relations between the EU and India are strengthening, relations between the United States and India are deteriorating. Despite the much celebrated relationship between Donald Trump and Narendra Modi in the late 2010s, the current atmosphere has deteriorated. The second Trump administration’s tariff salvos, public criticism of New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil, and episodic gestures toward Pakistan have jeopardized a quarter-century of progress.
In response, New Delhi is doing what it does best: covering itself. He warms up to Moscow when necessary and keeps pragmatic channels open with Beijing. While defense cooperation with the United States remains deep, the cost of neglect is increasing. When Washington imposes 50% tariffs on Indian exports, it not only creates leverage; this pushes India to redouble its efforts to diversify its economy away from the American market. The contradiction between “America First” and “Make in India” is no longer an abstract debate; it’s a daily obstacle for global boards.
A lesson in pragmatism
Europe, to its credit, read the moment and moved. The Commission has sent a strong signal by making India a leading partner from the start of its mandate and implementing a comprehensive set of free trade agreements and SDPs. The message is consistent: economic security means diverse interdependence, not autarky, and in a fractured world, “like-minded” does not necessarily mean “identical” on every issue.
For Washington, the lesson is not to panic, but to be competitive. This starts by defusing the tariff war and insulating critical technological cooperation from protectionist excesses. This means putting a realistic and narrow trade package back on the table that addresses mobility and supply chain security without seeking to debate every difference.
It starts with accepting India’s strategic autonomy on its own terms. Regarding Russia, Washington should stop asking New Delhi to be something it is not. Instead, the United States must present its own offer – in energy, defense co-production and manufacturing – too attractive to refuse. The EU-India summit shows what is possible when ambition meets pragmatism. If Washington wants to remain a serious partner, it must combine this priority with political discipline rather than performative friendship.
Erik Lenhart ((email protected)) holds a master’s degree in political science from Charles University. He is a former deputy head of mission of the Slovak Republic in Tokyo and the author of the award-winning novel Daughters of the Empire. Michael Tkacik ((email protected)) holds a PhD from the University of Maryland and a JD from Duke University. He is a professor of government and director of the School of Honors at Stephen F. Austin State University in Texas. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.