For years, EU-India relations have been described with a familiar refrain: “hitting below their potential”. It has become a comfortable line for policymakers on both sides – a diplomatic acknowledgment that the partnership has not produced what it could have. But few actually ask the more difficult question: what is this potential and what would a truly fair, balanced and mutually beneficial relationship look like? And just as important: is it possible?
Defining success is more complicated than repeating the familiar rhetoric of shared values and converging interests. As Brussels and New Delhi navigate an increasingly fractured geopolitical landscape, the old narratives around “shared values” and “natural partners” are beginning to seem insufficient. The most honest description emerging today is that of a partnership “out of necessity.” To some, this seems pessimistic. In reality, it may just be the maturity the relationship needs.
Let’s start with the obvious: trust is low. Competing interests, divergent worldviews, different regulatory cultures, and misaligned expectations have all contributed. But low confidence doesn’t automatically mean low potential. On the contrary, moving beyond illusions and embracing realism creates space for a more pragmatic, sustainable and honest partnership. In this context, the question of whether the EU and India can build “fair, balanced and mutually beneficial” relations becomes both more complex and more urgent. The ambition is admirable, but can it be achieved?
This is where the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), an improved Trade and Technology Council (TTC), a possible security and defense partnership and the new roadmap expected at the 2026 Summit – all infused by a responsible and strategically aligned private sector – will be decisive.
The FTA: political signal or transformation tool?
The current negotiation The EU-India free trade agreement represents a crucial test of this ambition. The conclusion of the FTA would undoubtedly be a political milestone, signaling that the relationship is finally ready to move beyond rhetoric. It remains to be seen, however, whether the FTA itself can be fair and transformative.
If the EU and India choose realism over rhetoric and build trust not only between governments but also between businesses, innovators and citizens, the 2026 summit could mark a real turning point, a moment when strategic clarity finally replaces political symbolism.
Although an FTA is widely seen as the cornerstone of the next phase of EU-India relations, the uncomfortable truth is that both sides will have to compromise – and do so visibly. India’s protectionist instincts remain strong; the EU, for once, is the target of difficult discussions on market access. This negotiation is unlike any other; here, political externalities far exceed the economic impact.
The last EU Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment confirms that the FTA would not change the macroeconomic situation: a modest GDP gain of 0.1 to 0.2 percent for the EU and of 0.6 to 1 percent for India. Rather, the real significance lies in an increase in bilateral trade volumes and increased supply chain diversification – both essential in the current geopolitical climate. If combined with a new type of investment agreement, a FTA could increase export-oriented investments in India and boost its manufacturing sector. It would also indicate that the EU is capable of pursuing a more strategic trade policy in the Indo-Pacific region, aligned with its broader geopolitical objectives. In short: the FTA will not be a game changer for GDP, but it will be a game changer for politics.
More than anything, an FTA perceived as fair by both partners could help bridge the trust deficit that has long hampered progress. Trade is not just about tariffs; it’s about predictability, transparency, standards and the certainty that businesses can operate without abrupt regulatory changes. For the FTA to have a real impact, it must address existing concerns and go beyond political symbolism, offering a true rules-based instrument that strengthens relationships through predictability and transparency, and thus builds business confidence.
Engaging the private sector: the missing link
To bridge the trust gap, government-to-government dialogue will not be enough. The engagement of individuals – and in particular the direct involvement of the private sector in strategic conversations – will be essential. Businesses understand operational bottlenecks, regulatory inconsistency and market access challenges much better than political actors. As a result, they can provide solutions that the public sector cannot envisage. As long as EU-India relations maintain their G2G orientation distinct from their B2B orientation, progress will remain slow and uneven.
The EU and India already have multiple strategic dialogues, but the private sector still too often remains an afterthought rather than a partner, behaving more like a consumer than a responsible stakeholder. For the FTA to be meaningful – for the TTC to be revived and connectivity, technology, supply chains and collaboration for the green transition to be expected to grow – the private sector must sit at the same table as governments and contribute responsibly to strategic decisions.
This is even more important at a time when EU foreign policy is undergoing structural change. Public sector-led foreign policy is a thing of the past. Through Global Gateway — the EU’s flagship initiative to build sustainable infrastructure through strengthened partnerships — the EU is moving from public sector-led cooperation to partnerships enabled by private capital, return on investment logic, blended finance and strategic industrial policy. The business world – from large conglomerates to small and medium-sized enterprises – is no longer a peripheral actor; it is at the center of the EU’s external engagement. This transformation is global, but nowhere is it more urgent than in EU-India relations.
The FTA negotiations – and, above all, the strategic partnership – cannot move forward without a private sector acting as a responsible protagonist. The public sector increasingly recognizes this reality; the challenge now is to bring the same level of awareness, strategy and alignment to the private sector. EU-India relations will not be “mutually beneficial” unless the private sector is involved from the outset and at a systemic level. A “fair, balanced and mutually beneficial” relationship requires it.
The same logic applies to the Trade and Technology Council. The TTC has enormous potential, but its performance so far has been poor. In theory, it should be one of the most promising strategic alignment tools. In practice, its results have not been sufficient because India approaches it with dynamism, entrepreneurship and rapid expansion, while Europe approaches technology through regulation, standard setting and risk management. These two models rarely meet.
The TTC needs a reboot – one that elevates the industry as a co-architect, not a passive stakeholder. Technological sovereignty is now at the heart of geopolitical power, and both sides increasingly understand the need to reduce their overdependence on the United States and China. A truly strategic TTC requires not only political alignment, but also practical cooperation driven by the companies building and deploying the technology.
Security and defense: the missing political anchor
The EU has recently developed a new tool in its external action toolbox: the Security and defense partnerships. Already launched with Japan and South Korea, these projects create a platform to deepen operational cooperation, build resilience and coordinate emerging threats. The planned security and defense partnership with India creates an important political bridge and helps reduce distrust. It could also facilitate cooperation between the defense industry – a key step that would help India diversify its suppliers while allowing Europe to achieve the cost-effective production scale it needs.
But here it is impossible to ignore the elephant in the room: India’s relationship with Russia. Unless addressed frankly, progress will be limited. An equitable partnership is not one in which both parties agree on everything, but one in which disagreements are understood, contextualized and managed with transparency. Ultimately, achieving fairness and balance in EU-India relations is less about eliminating asymmetries and more about managing them transparently and meeting expectations.
The next EU-India summit, scheduled for early 2026, will determine whether both sides are ready to move in this direction. Until then, three major developments are expected: the conclusion of FTA negotiations, the adoption of a security and defense partnership and the unveiling of a new EU-India road map. The latter is based on New EU-India strategic agenda: Council approves conclusions – Consilium and moves relationships forward from previous ones India-EU strategic partnership: a roadmap to 2025.
So, can EU-India relations ever be fair, balanced and mutually beneficial? Not perfectly – and certainly not symmetrically. But fairness does not require symmetry; it requires clear expectations, frank commitment, and a willingness to leverage differences rather than ignore them. As the FTA negotiations approach a decisive phase, both sides must define what success really means – through meaningful compromises, deeper strategic inclusion of the private sector, a recalibrated Trade and Technology Council, and an honest approach to security cooperation, including on the Russia issue. If the EU and India choose realism over rhetoric and build trust not only between governments but also between businesses, innovators and citizens, the 2026 summit could mark a real turning point, a moment when strategic clarity finally replaces political symbolism.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Stefania Benaglia is an EU foreign policy expert, specializing in EU-Asia relations and the Global Gateway. Based in Brussels, she advises public and private clients and previously led CEPS foreign policy. She has held positions at the European Commission and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, with experience in India, Israel, the United States, France and Spain. Image credit: Flickr/MEA photo gallery (cropped).
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