Europe and Australia wake up, not only to the challenges of a more antagonistic world order, but also to the imperative to work together to solve the common problems with which we are confronted. It was long to come.
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 produced a “peace dividend” which appeared in a 20 -year drop in defense and industrial database in Europe. Even the shock of the illegal Crimean crisis in Russia in 2014 did not dissipate the torpor that had settled on a continent comforted by the promise of American military support devoted to article 5 of NATO, which promises a collective defense in the event of an armed attack on any member.
The large -scale invasion of Vladimir Putin of Ukraine in February 2022 finally exploded the security spider canvases. As the Russia specialist observed, Keir Giles, in his 2024 book Who will defend Europe?: “After pressing the rehearsal button for more than a decade, some parts of Europe have definitely woke up.”
Europe is transformed, offering both lessons and strategic opportunities for Australia, if we are agile enough and open to grasp them.
Catalyst this was the disruptive impact of Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the awareness of Europeans that the dazzling of the El Dorado in the Far East had blinded them on the challenges and risks in the determined quest of China for the global strategic balance.
Europe is transformed, offering both lessons and strategic opportunities for Australia, if we are agile enough and open to grasp them.
Spain’s refusal to sign Notwithstanding, NATO has undertaken to spend five% of GDP in defense. This implies a certain creative accounting by including auxiliary areas such as cyber and defense infrastructures. But this broader ecosystem is also important in the systemic struggle between authoritarianism and responsible democracy, which does not distinguish between hemispheres.
Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security theaters are more interconnected than ever. China and North Korea are materially And politically encouraging the war of choice of Russian president Vladimir Putin against Ukraine. India continues to buy Russian oil and the maintenance of military ties with Moscow, reflecting historically close relations with the USSR and as a cover against China.
Russia is eyeing opportunities in Southeast Asia. The Indonesian President Prabowo suffered, after visiting Russia as Minister of Defense and elected president, made his third visit to Putin in less than a year, prioritization The Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum on the G7 summit in Canada. This has animated prospects for bilateral cooperation in various fields, including space and civil nuclear reactors for Indonesia, and the creation of a joint investment fund of several billion dollars.
In January, Indonesia became a full-fledged member of the Brics group, which Moscow and Beijing promote as a constraints to the structures dominated by the United States. Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are members of aspirants Brics.
It is fair to bet that, even if the war in Ukraine ends soon, the militarized economy of Russia would not return to the manufacture of washing machines, but would rather seek the export markets in our region.
Despite the turbulence from Washington, Australia’s strategic interests remain centered and served by our alliance with the United States. It is not possible to undo decades of shared experience, deep interoperability and common platforms, weapons and technology systems. However, even if we support Washington that we make a serious and proportional contribution to defense, we must take advantage of additional partnerships in the continuation of the burden, economies of scale and the increase in our industrial redundancy and our resilience in anticipation of increased tension or conflict.
Europe has a lot to offer, not only thanks to its new investments in defense and national security spending, but because of its determination to be a real strategic player worldwide. In addition, Europe is already strongly engaged in our region, especially as the third help provider (After us and Japan), and the largest development aid for global scale.
Several European companies are Australian Defense prime numbers, including Thales, Rheinmetall, Kongsberg and Saab. The EU has become a strategic partner of the Association of Nations of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) in 2020 and launched its EU cooperation strategy in Indo-Pacific in 2021. The EU signed security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea in 2024-the first with partners outside Europe. Australia is now negotiation His with Brussels.
Europe has a lot to offer, not only thanks to its new investments in defense and national security spending, but because of its determination to be a real strategic player worldwide.
A new level of innovative and resilient European nations, notably Poland and the Nordic and Baltic countries (the “NB8”), has crystallized. Deeply integrated into the innovation ecosystem of the defense of Ukraine and, like Australia, having close links with the American defense base, they are at the external, activist and clearly in the eyes of China and Russia.
We have a lot to gain from greater collaboration with them in military technologies such as drones and other autonomous systems. We can benefit from their harshly won experience in the promotion of social cohesion and resilience in the face of the “hybrid” war, which operates below the threshold of military conflicts to overthrow and subsequently subverts democracies.
During the recent NATO summit, Australia signed an agreement With the NATO support and supply organization to facilitate collaborative purchasing efforts with NATO partners. This is based on the institutional relationship that Australia has forged with NATO in joint operations in Afghanistan and as a member of the “Four Indo-Pacific Four”, alongside Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.
The partnership for Indo-Pacific industrial resilience, launched at US Initiative in 2024, is a new board for more collaboration between Europe and Australia. It aims to create an ecosystem of trust among industry, capital suppliers and defense customers to promote information exchange, technical cooperation, resilience of the supply chain and co-production. Its 14 members extend over the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions and include key European countries and Australian partners such as Japan and South Korea.
It is a solid basis of experience and confidence on which we can and must develop a stronger collaboration with Europe. The conclusion of a production and defense partnership focused on production, and not platitudes, is outright in the interests of Australia.
About The Author
